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ABSTRACT Critical technological systems exhibit complex dynamic characteristics such as time-dependent 
behaviour, functional dependencies among events, sequencing and priority of causes that may alter the effects 
of failure. Dynamic fault trees (DFTs) have been used in the past to model the failure logic of such systems, 
but the quantitative analysis of DFTs has assumed the existence of precise failure data and statistical 
independence among events, which are unrealistic assumptions. In this paper, we propose an improved 
approach to reliability analysis of dynamic systems, allowing for uncertain failure data and statistical and 
stochastic dependencies among events. In the proposed framework, DFTs are used for dynamic failure 
modelling. Quantitative evaluation of DFTs is performed by converting them into generalised stochastic Petri 
nets. When failure data are unavailable, expert judgment and fuzzy set theory are used to obtain reasonable 
estimates. The approach is demonstrated on a simplified model of a Cardiac Assist System. 
INDEX TERMS Dynamic systems, Fault tree analysis, Fuzzy set theory, Petri nets, Reliability analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is widely used for safety and 
reliability analysis of systems. FTA models are well-
structured and easily understood. However, they are unable 
to model some aspects of system behaviour such as 
dependencies between subsystems and components, and 
ordering among the component failure occurrences. For this 
reason, application of classical FTA is limited to systems 
whose components have no stochastic and temporal 
dependencies.  However, in practical technological systems, 
not all events are statistically independent, and in such 
situations, the assumption of statistical and stochastic 
independence of events can lead to an inappropriate 
estimation of system reliability. In order to model 
dependencies among events, classical FTA has been 
extended to introduce dynamic fault trees [1] and temporal 
fault trees (TFTs) [2], [3]. 
DFTs is a well-established dynamic version of the Fault 
Tree (FT) that enables modelling time-dependent behaviour in 
dynamic systems. Temporal dependencies among the system 
components and ordering among events are modelled using 
DFT gates such as functional dependency (FDEP), Priority-
AND (PAND), and SPARE gates. These gates capture 
temporal behaviour, and therefore classical combinatorial 
solutions for  the quantification of FTs are not suitable for 
DFTs. Alternative analytical solutions have been proposed in 
[4], [5], but these approaches do not account for stochastic 
dependencies among events or cater for uncertainty in failure 
data.  
DFTs can be quantified by converting them into Markov 
chains [6], [7]. However, Markov chains are limited to 
exponential distributions and the associated memoryless 
property. This requirement may be too tight for modelling 
complex systems. Bayesian networks (BN) based 
methodologies [8]-[12] have also been developed for the 
quantitative analysis of DFTs.  BN-based approaches can use 
both discrete- and continuous- time models. When BN models 
are used to quantify DFTs, first it is necessary to decide the 
model of time. On the one hand, with discrete-time models the 
issue of time-discretisation arises [9]. On the other hand, with 
continuous-time models it may become tedious to express the 
joint probability distribution of internal nodes with many 
parents with a probability density function. Expert judgments 
are often used for this purpose, but the integration of expert 
judgement may become more tedious because it will be 
necessary to specify the information as probability density 
functions instead of rules, and this is not always intuitive for 
the designer and engineers.  
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 Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPNs) [12] are also 
used to quantify DFTs. The underlying reachability graph of a 
GSPN is isomorphic to a continuous time Markov chain. 
However, in contrast to Markov chains, GSPN models are able 
to model non-exponential distributions. Similar to BN-based 
models, GSPN can model stochastic dependencies among 
events. In fact, Generalised Continuous time BN (GCTBN) 
models [13] are solved by converting them to GSPN. In 
addition to the benefits of BN-based models for DFT 
modelling, GSPN models provide a one-to-one interface for 
other purposes such as formal specification and verification, 
which cannot be handled with other formalisms. Accordingly, 
this work adopts GSPN as an underlying stochastic modelling 
formalism to quantify and evaluate DFT models. 
Generally, quantitative FTA assumes known failure rates or 
probabilities of failure of system components. In practice, it is 
often difficult to obtain this data for all the components, which 
introduces uncertainty in the analysis. A few methods have 
been proposed to perform quantitative analysis with unknown 
and uncertain failure data. One of such approaches is the fuzzy 
fault tree analysis (FFTA) [14], which is an extension to 
classical fault trees where fuzzy failure data are used in the 
reliability quantification process instead of crisp values. More 
information about FFTA and its applications in different areas 
can be found in [15]. As FFTA is an extension to classical FTs, 
it inherits all the limitations of the classical FTA. 
Recently, some attempts such as [16]±[23] have been made 
to incorporate the concept of uncertainty in DFT analysis. In 
this paper, we propose a comprehensive uncertainty-aware 
framework for reliability analysis of complex dynamic 
systems. The framework combines DFTs with GSPN and 
fuzzy set theory. DFTs are used to model the dynamic failure 
behaviour of systems. To quantify the DFTs including 
statistical and stochastic dependencies, DFTs are translated 
into a GSPN model. Fuzzy set theory and expert judgments 
are combined together to obtain estimates of failure data for 
basic events (BEs) of the DFT when such data are unavailable. 
Accordingly, the contribution of this paper is the proposal 
of a novel method, which is able to take into account statistical 
and temporal dependencies in the failure logic as well as 
uncertainty modelling in component failure data. This 
approach quantifies complex and dynamic systems accurately 
taking into account temporal and stochastic dependencies, and 
it enables the reliability analysis of complex systems with lack 
of exact failure data of its constituent components. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II 
presents fundamental concepts and related work. Section III 
introduces the proposed reliability analysis framework. 
Section IV applies the proposed approach to a numerical case 
study and finally, Section V draws conclusions. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
A. DYNAMIC FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
Fault tree analysis was first introduced by Bell laboratories in 
1962 for a ballistic control system [24]. The process to design 
an FTA model follows a top-down procedure, starting from 
the undesired system level top-event (TE), which represents 
the system failure condition. The TE is decomposed into a 
combination of intermediate events, which are defined with 
Boolean logic. The intermediate events are further 
decomposed by using Boolean logic down to the specification 
of the lowest-level event causes, which are named Basic 
Events (BEs). Fig. 1 shows an FTA example. 
 
FIGURE 1.  Example fault tree. 
 
FTA cannot accommodate temporal dependencies. For 
instance, Boolean logic does not allow temporal ordering of 
events the effect of which may be significant. For instance, 
many systems use activation mechanisms to activate spares 
when primary systems fail. Whether the activation mechanism 
has failed before or after failure of the primary defines whether 
the spare is activated. To address such issues, classical FTA 
was augmented with gates that capture dynamics in the DFT 
method [1]. Fig. 2 below shows the main static and dynamic 
gates used in DFT analysis, the function of which is briefly 
defined as follows: 
x Y = AND (X1«;N), Y occurs only if all the BEs 
{X1«;N} fail simultaneously. 
x Y = OR (X1«;N), Y occurs if any of the BEs {X1, 
«;N} fails. 
x Y = PAND (X1«;N), Y occurs only if BEs {X1, 
«;N} fail in left-to-right graphical order. That is, 
OHWXVGHQRWHEHIRUHZLWKWKHV\PERO³´WKHQ3$1'
is defined as: Y = AND (X1<X2«;N-1<XN). 
x FDEP (T, D1«'N): the occurrence of the trigger 
event T enforces the occurrence of the BEs {D1«
DN}. This gate has no logical output. 
x Y = SPARE (P, S1«6N), the primary input P is an 
active BE, while the standby inputs {S1«6N} are 
standby BEs. The standby BEs can have a dormancy 
IDFWRU Į WKDW DIIHFWV WKH IDLOXUH UDWH RI WKH %(
LQGLFDWLQJDKRWVSDUHĮ ZDUPĮRUFROG
Į VSDUH 
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x Y = SEQ (X1 « ;N) models the sequence 
enforcing event, which enforces the events to occur 
in an specific left-to-right order. 
A DFT model can be analysed qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The main result of qualitative analysis is the 
Minimal Cut Sequence Set (MCSQ) expression, which 
determines which are the temporal combination of minimal 
necessary BEs that can cause the system-level failure. The 
main outcome of quantitative analysis is the failure probability 
of the top event (TE), typically representing the probability of 
a system failure. The work presented in this paper focuses on 
quantitative analysis. 
Quantitative analysis requires specification of probabilistic 
distributions of BEs. Widely accepted distributions include 
Weibull and exponential distributions, but this is dependent on 
the specific system under study. Note that the quantitative 
analysis is not only limited to the system level failure 
probability, other assessments and metrics can be extracted 
from the DFT model such as the criticality analysis, which 
calculates the contribution of each BE to the occurrence of the 
TE. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.  DFT logic gates. 
 
B. PETRI NETS 
Petri nets (PNs) are a graphical and mathematical modelling 
formalism suitable for the specification and analysis of 
complex, distributed and concurrent systems [25]. A 
conventional PN is a bipartite directed graph containing a 
finite set of places, a finite set of transitions, and a finite set of 
directed arcs. In a PN model, places and transitions are 
graphically represented by circles and rectangles, respectively.  
Directed arcs are used to connect places to transitions and 
transitions to places. Tokens (black dots) are used to specify 
the states of the places in a PN model. The enabling condition 
of a transition is defined as the presence of a certain number 
of tokens in its input place(s). When a transition fires, a certain 
number of tokens are deposited to the output place(s) of the 
transition. 
 
FIGURE 3.  Example of a PN. 
 
Classical PNs are suitable to model simple behaviour of 
systems, however, to model more complex scenarios, PNs 
have been extended with different features. One such feature 
is the inhibitor arc, which is usually represented by an arc that 
ends in a small circle. This type of arc is different from a 
normal arc because it enables a transition when the input place 
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has no token and it disables a transition when a place has a 
token, i.e., opposite behaviour of the normal arc. Stochastic 
Petri nets (SPNs) [26] are another extension of PNs that allow 
defining exponentially distributed transition delays. GSPNs 
[13] extended SPNs by allowing inclusion of immediate and 
timed transitions in a single PN model. Black and white bars 
are used to represent immediate and timed transitions, 
respectively. In a GSPN model, an immediate transition has 
priority over a timed transition and fires first when both are 
enabled to fire simultaneously. 
Application of PNs for system safety and reliability analysis 
can be traced back to 1980s [27], [28]. In [29], [30] 
methodologies have been proposed to convert classical fault 
trees to PNs for reliability evaluation. DFTs have been 
translated into GSPNs for reliability analysis of dynamic 
systems in [31]±[33]. 
C. FUZZY SETS IN UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
The fuzzy set theory was formalized in 1965 by Zadeh [34], 
and also has been widely applied, including for dealing with 
uncertainty in safety and reliability analysis. The use of 
qualitative fuzzy terms indeed provides flexible modelling of 
imprecise data and information. The main purpose of fuzzy 
terms is to assist gradual transition between varieties of 
conditions. A classical set contains expressions, which satisfy 
exact characteristics of membership. On the other hand, a 
fuzzy set contains expressions that satisfy ambiguous 
characteristics of membership, i.e. the characteristics of fuzzy 
set expressions can be partial. A comparison between a 
classical set (Boolean) and a fuzzy set can be seen in Fig. 4. 
As it can be seen for classical sets, in a universe U, an element 
D can either be a member of some crisp set S or not. This 
binary characteristic of membership can be defined as follows: 
 ୗ ൌ ൜ ? B? ሺሻ ? B? ሺሻሺ ?ሻ         
 
FIGURE 4.  Diagrams for a classical set (Boolean) and a fuzzy set [35]. 
 
The characteristic of the binary membership is extended by 
Zadeh to incorporate the different rate of membership on the 
real continuous distance interval from zero to one [0, 1]. Zero 
means that there is no membership whereas the endpoint of the 
distance (one) indicates complete membership. A set of 
universe U, which accommodates rates of membership is 
named a fuzzy set. Thus, using the mathematical notation 
Ɋୗ෨ ሺሻBSሾ ?ǡ ?ሿ, a fuzzy set  ෨ can be defined with Ɋୗ෨ ሺሻ the 
rate of membership of element D in ෨, or briefly membership 
of ෨. The value of  Ɋୗ෨ ሺሻ belongs in the distance interval [0, 
1] and corresponds to the rate to which element D is a member 
of fuzzy set ෨. The higher the value of Ɋୗ෨ ሺሻthe stronger the 
rate of membership of D in ෨. Information about  arithmetic 
operations on fuzzy numbers can be found in [36]. 
Several developments of fuzzy set theory have been 
proposed to improve the flexibility of conventional fuzzy set 
theory. Atanassov [37] introduced an extension of fuzzy set 
theory called intuitionistic fuzzy sets. These include 
membership as well as non-membership functions, and can 
deal better with uncertainties that may happen from biased 
results. However, intuitionistic fuzzy sets increase complexity 
and computation time. Chen and Hwang developed fuzzy 
reasoning using algebraic properties of fuzzy sets in order to 
provide a solution to complex problems, including bounded-
sum, unbounded-sum, union, intersection, and algebraic 
product [38]. In addition, Atanassov [39] introduced an 
extension to intuitionistic fuzzy sets with hesitation margin 
groups to cope with complexity. However, computation time 
remains a significant limitation of this model.  
III. THE PROPOSED UNCERTAINTY-AWARE DYNAMIC 
RELIABILITY APPROACH 
The framework of the proposed approach is shown in Fig. 5. 
The approach consists of four steps: Fault Tree Modelling, 
Petri Net Modelling, Failure Data Collection, and Reliability 
Quantification. Fault Tree Modelling deals with the creation 
of a DFT of the system under study. Petri Net Modelling and 
Failure Data Collection are executed in parallel, where in the 
Petri Net Modelling step the DFT is mapped into a GSPN 
model and in the Failure Data Collection step the failure rate 
of BEs with unknown data are collected. These data are then 
incorporated into the GSPN model. The final step is the 
Reliability Quantification, where all the analyses are 
performed on the GSPN model.  Detailed descriptions of the 
steps are provided in the following subsections. 
A. FAULT TREE MODELLING 
In this step, the dynamic behaviour of systems is modelled 
using DFT. As DFT is an extended version of classical fault 
trees, it can be created following the procedure described in 
the fault tree handbook [40].  The objectives of a DFT in 
general include (1) identifying all possible ways of causing an 
undesired event which is called top event (TE), (2) providing 
a provable record of the analysis process, and (3) providing the 
foundations of design evaluation and practical alternatives 
[41].  
Selection of a TE requires good knowledge of system 
function and from that projection of hazardous deviations 
IURPWKDWIXQFWLRQ$QH[DPSOH7(LV³IDLOXUHRIFRQWUROFLUFXLW
M which sends a siJQDO ZKHQ LW LV QHFHVVDU\´ >42], [43]. 
Boundary conditions are then determined distinguishing 
which failures and contributing factors will be included in the 
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analysis and which are not. Finally, the resolution is 
determined defining the level of detail in the analysis of root 
causes. DFTs are constructed in a top-down fashion using the 
logic gates outlined in section II.A to show the logical and 
temporal connections between events. The following sections 
deal with DFT evaluation.
 
 
FIGURE 5.  Framework of the proposed uncertainty-aware approach. 
B. PETRI NET MODELLING 
This step takes the DFT generated in the previous step as input 
and converts it into a GSPN model. Ǽach DFT module (e.g., 
basic event, logic gate) is translated into a GSPN sub-net and 
all the sub-nets are combined to obtain an overall GSPN of the 
DFT. ȉhe conversion of DFTs to GSPN is done by following 
the concepts from[29]±[32],[44].  The GSPN model of a BE is 
shown in Fig. 6. The place x.up represents the state when the 
basic event x has not occurred, i.e., the component associated 
with the BE has not failed. The timed transition x.f is 
characterised by the failure rate of the BE. If the failure rate 
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ሺD?ሻ is exponentially distributed, then the probability that the 
transition is fired at the time instant D? is  ? െ D?ିఒ௧ ǤThe place 
x.dn represents the failed state of the basic event x. This place 
receives token when x.f fires. Note that the failure rate of some 
BEs may not be available. The GSPN of such events would 
still be created, but the value of the firing rate of the timed 
transition is left empty, and incorporated later on using expert 
judgment. 
 
FIGURE 6.  GSPN of a basic event. 
 
FIGURE 7.  GSPN of AND gate. 
 
FIGURE 8.  GSPN of OR gate. 
 
GSPN of Boolean gates (AND and OR) are shown in Figs. 
7 and 8, respectively. In the GSPN model of the AND gate, all 
input places (X1.dn, X2GQ«;n.dn) are connected to a single 
immediate transition. When all the input places get a token, 
then the immediate transition fires and deposits a token to the 
output place, X.dn, i.e. all inputs of the AND gate must be true 
to make the outcome of the AND gate true. Unlike the GSPN 
model of the AND gate, the GSPN model of the OR gate 
represents disjunction of events. In the latter, each of the input 
places is connected to distinct immediate transition, which 
makes sure that the output place will get a token when any of 
the place gets a token, i.e., the output of the OR gate becomes 
true when any of the inputs becomes true. 
In the GSPN model of the PAND gate, the place X.dn 
represents the outcome of the PAND gate. If events occur in a 
required sequence, then this place gets a token. If the 
sequencing is violated, then the place X.ok gets a token, a 
confirmation that PAND gate output cannot be true. This place 
is connected to the immediate transition Tn using an inhibitor 
arc, which ensures that the place representing the PAND gate 
outcome will not get a token if all the input events of the 
PAND gate occur but not in the required sequence. 
  
FIGURE 9.  GSPN of PAND gate. 
  
FIGURE 10.  GSPN of FDEP gate. 
 
The GSPN model in Fig.10 models the behaviour of the 
FDEP gate. As seen in section II.A, the FDEP gate has no 
logical output. If the trigger event occurs, the dependent event 
will also occur. In the GSPN model, the place T.dn represents 
the failed state of the trigger event, whereas the places {D1.dn, 
«'n.dn} represent the failed state of the dependent events. 
The dependent events can fail independently due to their 
internal failures and the places representing their failed states 
can get tokens. However, as seen in the Fig. 10, the places 
{D1GQ«'n.dn} will get a token if the place T.dn  gets a 
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token, i.e., dependent events will occur if the trigger event 
occurs. 
  
FIGURE 11.  GSPN of SPARE gate. 
 
 
   
FIGURE 12.  GSPN of SEQ gate. 
 
The GSPN model of a warm spare gate is shown in Fig. 11. 
The places S1.dn and S2.dn represent the failed state of the two 
spare components S1 and S2, respectively. For both 
components, it is possible to reach the failed state in two ways. 
In the first way, when the components are in passive mode, the 
internal failure of the components will take them to failed 
states. In the GSPN model, S1.passive and S2.passive 
represent the passive modes of the two spare components. 
Timed transitions S1.p_f and S2.p_f are two timed transitions 
representing the failure rate of the components in passive 
mode. Firing of these transitions will take the components to 
their failed mode. In the second way, firstly, the spare 
components are activated due to the failure of the primary 
component. This scenario is modelled by immediate 
transitions wsp1 and wsp2 for components S1 and S2, 
respectively. Timed transitions S1.a_f and S2.a_f are two 
timed transitions representing the failure rate of the 
components in their active mode and firing of these transitions 
will take the components from their active mode to their failed 
mode. When places P.dn, S1.dn and S2.dn get marked (i.e., all 
components failed), the immediate transition wsp3 will fire 
and deposit a token to place Y.dn, i.e., making the outcome of 
the spare gate true. A cold spare gate can be modelled using 
GSPN in the similar way; however, for the cold spare gate the 
part showing the failure of the spare components in passive 
mode will not be required. 
A GSPN model of a SEQ gate is shown in Fig. 12. This 
model forces the input events to occur in a sequence. For 
instance, if we consider timed transition X2.f, this can fire only 
after X1.dn gets a token, i.e., when the event X1 occurs. In this 
way, the GSPN model ensures that the event X2 can occur only 
after X1. The place X.dn represents the outcome of the SEQ 
gate and this place will get a token when the last event in the 
SEQ gate becomes true thus maintaining the sequencing. 
Given the above conversion rules for the basic event and the 
logic gates, Fig.13 shows a pseudocode of a function that 
converts a DFT to GSPN in the course of a depth first traversal 
of the DFT. We assume a typical computational representation 
of a treeZKHUHDJDWHLVDµQRGH¶SRLQWLQJWRDµFKLOG¶ILUVW
input to the gate) which is then linked to a list of siblings 
representing the rest of gate inputs. Basic events do not have a 
child and can be detected as such. 
The function is called with the top event of the DFT as 
argument. The tree is traversed via a recursive call until basic 
events are found and translated to simple GSPN modules 
using the rules given in the paper. When gates are encountered, 
the algorithm determines whether inputs to the gate have been 
translated to GSPN or not. If inputs have not yet been 
translated, a recursive call is initiated to do the translation 
bottom up at lower levels first. On the other hand, if inputs to 
the gate have been translated, then a GSPN module for the gate 
can be constructed using the rules given in this section for each 
type of gate and the input GSPNs. Progressively, gates at 
higher level of the tree and ultimately the top event of the DFT 
are translated to GSPN using appropriate rules and input 
GSPN modules. The computational complexity of this 
translation process depends on the size and complexity of the 
DFT itself. Moreover, the types of logic gates that are 
translated also affects the performance of the translation 
process.
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C. FAILURE DATA COLLECTION 
The BEs of the DFT can be classed into those with known 
failure rates and those with unknown failure rates. Known 
failure rates are typically determined by consulting reliability 
data handbooks such as PDS or OREDA [45],[46]. For 
estimation of unknown failure rates, methods include 
statistical extrapolation, and expert judgment [47]. In this 
study, the expert judgment method is used as an integration of 
fuzzy set theory and subjective opinions [48]. Various 
PHWKRGVDUHDYDLODEOHWRDJJUHJDWHH[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQ, such as 
fuzzy priority relations, game theory, arithmetic averaging 
operation, max±min Delphi method, and similarity 
aggregation method (SAM) [49],[50],[51].  Liu et al. [52] have 
argued that there is no way to determine which technique is 
superior. 
In this study, we have opted for the SAM method, which 
considers both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of 
experts. The qualitative terms used in the study to express and 
collect WKHH[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQV are defined as a combination of 
fuzzy triangular and fuzzy trapezoidal numbers from which 
failure rates are estimated [53]. The group of experts was 
defined as heterogeneous because in practice their opinion 
brings different value and weight to the final result. 
Consequently, for qualifying the measurements, the relevance 
of the experts was ranked using a methodology that takes into 
account the professional position, job experience, education 
level, and age (see [54]-[59]). The score rating of the experts 
was determined according to Table I. 
The rating of an expert judgment can be done according to 
the weight given to each BE. The concept of linguistic 
expressions has a high value in dealing with any circumstances 
that are ill-defined or complex to be described in the old model 
of quantitative expression [24]. In order to convert qualitative 
terms to corresponding fuzzy numbers, Chen and Hwang [38] 
represented a numerical approximation. To acquire this 
criterion, there are common verbal expressions in the system. 
&KHQ¶VFRQYHUVion scale is provided in Table II in which scale 
one contains two verbal terms and scale eight contains thirteen 
verbal terms [60], [61]. In addition, Lavasani et al. [58] 
suggested that humans are capable of distinguishing 
effectively between five and nine linguistic expressions that 
cover a range of possible outcomes. Using this theory, we have 
opted for a scale of six using five verbal terms that provide 
options for the subjective evaluation of experts with regards to 
estimating the probability of failure. Table III presents the 
fuzzy membership function in the form of trapezoidal 
numbers. 
The linguistic expressions of Fig. 14 are in the form of both 
triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers and it is possible to 
transform all the triangular fuzzy numbers to the 
corresponding trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. Table III illustrates 
the fuzzy numbers of Fig. 14 in the form of trapezoidal 
numbers. 
dftTOgspn (dft node) { 
 
dft rn 
   
  if (node is basic event) { 
       translate node to GSPN module  
       add new GSPN module to list of GSPN modules 
  }     
  else {                                       //node is a gate 
      if (child of node has GSPN translation) { //gate inputs have GSPN translations 
              translate node to GSPN module     //create GSPN module for gate 
              add new GSPN module to list of GSPN modules 
       }  
       else {                                  //gate inputs not translated  
              for (rn = child of node and all siblings) {    //all gate inputs 
                     dftTOgspn (rn)             //recursive call  
              } 
       } 
  } 
} 
 
FIGURE 13. Pseudocode to convert DFT to GSPN. 
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FIGURE 14.  Transformation of scale six. 
 
Let us assume that each expert, El (l = 1, 2, . . ., m) expresses 
their viewpoint about a specific attribute in a certain context 
using qualitative terms. The qualitative terms are converted to 
the corresponding fuzzy numbers as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I. SCORE RATING ACCORDING TO THE EXPERT¶S TRAITS 
Condition Classification Score 
Professional 
position 
Senior academic, GM/DGM, Director 5 
Junior academic, Manager, Factory 
Inspector 4 
Engineer, Supervisors 3 
Technician, Graduate apprentice, 
Foreman 2 
Operator 1 
Job 
Experience 
More than 30 years 5 
20±29 4 
10±19 3 
6±9 2 
 1 
Education PhD 5 
Master 4 
Bachelor 3 
Higher National Diploma (HND) 2 
School level 1 
Age More than 50 4 
40±49 3 
30±39 2 
Less than 30 1 
 
 
TABLE II. QUALITATIVE TERMS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING FUZZY NUMBERS [38] 
Qualitative 
terms 
Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 5 Scale 6 Scale 7 Scale 8 
None        (0,0,0.1) 
Very low   (0,0,0.2)  (0,0,0.1,0.2) (0,0,0.1,0.2) (0,0,0.2) (0,0.1,0.2) 
Low-Very        (0,0,0.1,0.3) (0.1,0.2,0.3) 
Low  (0,0,0.2,0.4) (0.1,0.2,0.3) (0,0,0.3) (0,0.2,0.4) (0.1,0.25,0.4) (0,0.2,0.4) (0.1,0.3,0.5) 
Fairly low    (0,0.25,0.5) (0.2,0.4,0.6)  (0.2, 0.35,0.5) (0.3,0.4,0.5) 
Mol. Low        (0.4,0.45,0.5) 
Medium (0.4,0.6,0.8) (0.2,0.5,0.8) (0.3,0.5,0.7) (0.3,0.5,0.7)  (0.3,0.5,0.7) (0.3,0.5,0.7) (0.3,0.5,0.7) 
Mol. High        (0.5,0.55,0.6) 
Fairly High    (0.5,0.75,1) (0.4,0.6,0.8)  (0.5,0.65,0.8) (0.5,0.6,0.7) 
High (0.6,0.8,1) (0.6,0.8,1,1) (0.6,0.8,1) (0.7,1,1) (0.6,0.75,0.9) (0.6,0.75,0.9) (0.6,0.8,1) (0.5,0.7,0.9) 
High-Very High       (0.7,0.9,1,1) (0.7,0.8,0.9) 
Very High   (0.8,1,1)  (0.8,0.9,1,1) (0.8,0.9,1,1) (0.8,1,1) (0.8,0.9,1) 
Excellent        (0.9,1,1) 
Mol.: More or less.  
TABLE III. FUZZY NUMBERS OF CONVERSION SCALE SIX 
Linguistic Expressions Fuzzy Numbers 
Very low (VL) (0, 0, 0.1, 0.2) 
Low (L) (0.1, 0.25, 0.25, 0.4) 
Medium (M) (0.3, 0.5, 0.5, 0.7) 
High (H) (0.6, 0.75, 0.75, 0.9) 
Very High (VH) (0.8, 0.9, 1, 1) 
 
Step 1: Computing the degree of similarity (degree of 
agreement). ୳୴൫෩୳ǡ ෩୴൯is defined as similarity between 
opinions of each pair of experts D?௨and D?௩. If D?ሚ= (a1, a2, a3) 
and D?෩ = (b1, b2, b3,) are the two standard triangular fuzzy 
numbers, the degree of agreement function of S is defined as: 
D?൫D?ሚǡ D?෨൯ ൌ  ? െ  ?D? ൌ  ?෍ȁD?௜ െ D?௜ȁ௝ୀଷ௜ୀଵ ሺ ?ሻ 
Step 2: When (෩,෩) B? [0, 1], the greater the value of S (෩,෩ሻ 
the higher the similarity between two experts with respect to 
fuzzy numbers ෩and෩. For two standard trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers, the value of j in Equation (2) should be equal to 4.    
The Average of Agreement (AA) degree D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ of an 
H[SHUW¶VRSLQLRQV is given by: 
D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൌ  ?D? െ  ?෍ D?ሺD?෨௨ǡ D?෨௩ሻ௠௨ஷ௩௩ୀଵ ሺ ?ሻ 
Step 3: The Relative Agreement (RA) degree, D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ of 
all experts is given by: 
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D?௨ሺD? ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ D?ሻD?D?D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൌ D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ? D?D?ሺD?௩ሻ௠௩ୀଵ ሺ ?ሻ 
Step 4: The Consensus Coefficient (CC) degree, D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ of 
expert opinions, D?௨ሺD? ൌ  ?ǡ  ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ D?ሻ is given by: D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൌ D?  ? D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻ ڄ D?D?ሺ୳ሻሺ ?ሻ 
Where D?ሺD?௨ሻ is the weighting factor for expert D?௨ Ǥ Using 
the weighting criteria from Table I, D?ሺD?௨ሻ can be calculated 
as: D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൌ D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ? D?D?ሺD?௝ሻ௠௝ୀଵ ሺ ?ሻ 
where D?D?ሺD?௝ሻ is the total weight scored by an expert D?௝ Ǥ 
The coefficient D? in Equation (5) is presented as a relaxation 
IDFWRU RI WKH XQWDNHQ SURFHGXUH VDWLVI\LQJ   D?   ,W
illustrates the importance of W(୳) over RA(୳). WhenȾ = 
0, no weight could be given to it by the experts and thereby a 
homogenous group of experts should be employed, whereas Ⱦ= 1 signifies that the consensus degree among the different 
expert opinions is high enough to assign it to good weight. 
Hsu and Chen [62] suggest that the consensus coefficient of 
each expert is better known when the comparative competency 
of each expert opinion is estimated. Therefore, it is important 
for the decision maker to obtain a proper value ofȾ. 
Step 5: The aggregated rHVXOWRIWKHH[SHUWV¶MXGJPHQWD?෨AG, 
can be calculated as follows: D?෨AGൌ D?D?ሺD?ଵሻ ൈ D?෨ଵ ൅ D?D?ሺD?ଶሻ ൈ D?෨ଶ ൅ ڮ ൅ D?D?ሺD?௠ሻ ൈD?෨௠ሺ ?ሻ 
Step 6: Defuzzification procedure. In the fuzzy set theory, 
defuzzification is employed to arrive at a crisp quantified 
outcome. Zhao and Govind [63] explore defuzzification issues 
in the application of fuzzy control in industrial operations. In 
general, the way defuzzification is done defines further 
decision making in a fuzzy environment. In this study, the 
center of area (CoA) of the defuzzification environment 
method is employed to obtain crisp failure possibilities (CFPs) 
of BEs. This method was extended by Sugeno et al. [64]. 
Equation (8) defines how deffuzzified output is derived using 
this technique from fuzzy membership functions: 
D?B?ൌ B?D?௜ሺD?ሻD?D?D?B?D?௜ ሺD?ሻD?D?ሺ ?ሻ 
where X* denotes the defuzzified output, D?௜ሺD?ሻ models the 
aggregated membership function, and x denotes the output 
variable. 
Equation (8) can be applied to both trapezoidal and 
triangular fuzzy numbers. 
Defuzzification of triangular fuzzy number D?ሚ= (a1, a2, a3) 
is given by equation (9). 
D?B?ൌ B? D? െ D?ଶD?ଶ െ D?ଵ D?D?D?൅ B? D?ଷ െ D?D?ଷ െ D?ଶ D?D?D?௔య௔మ௔మ௔భB? D? െ D?ଶD?ଶ െ D?ଵ D?D?൅ B? D?ଷ െ D?D?ଷ െ D?ଶ D?D?௔య௔మ௔మ௔భൌ  ? ?ሺD?ଵ൅D?ଶ൅D?ଷሻሺ ?ሻ 
Defuzzification of trapezoidal fuzzy numberD?ሚ= (a1, a2, a3, 
a4) can be obtained by Equation (10). 
D?B?ൌ B? D? െ D?ଵD?ଶ െ D?ଵ D?D?D?൅ B? D?D?D?൅ B? D?ସ െ D?D?ସ െ D?ଷ D?D?D?௔ర௔య௔య௔మ௔మ௔భB? D? െ D?ଵD?ଶ െ D?ଵ D?D?൅ B? D?D?൅ B? D?ସ െ D?D?ସ െ D?ଷ D?D?௔ర௔య௔య௔మ௔మ௔భ  ൌ ሺD?ସ ൅ D?ଷሻଶ െ D?ସD?ଷ െ ሺD?ଵ ൅ D?ଶሻଶ ൅ D?ଵD?ଶ ?ሺD?ସ ൅ D?ଷ െ D?ଶ െ D?ଵሻ ሺ ? ?ሻ 
 
Step 7: Converting corresponding crisp possibility of BEs 
into failure probability (FP)  
Equation (11) is expressed by Onisawa [65] to convert crisp 
possibility of BEs into corresponding FP. Onisawa [65], [66] 
have mentioned that this Equation is obtained by certain 
characteristics including appropriateness of anthropomorphic 
feeling to the logarithmic amount of a physical value. 
D?D?ൌ ൝ ?Ȁ ? ?௄ ǡ D?D?D? ്  ? ?ǡ D?D?D? ൌ  ?ǡD?ൌ ൤൬  ?D?D?D?െ  ?൰൨ଵ ଷൗ ൈ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሺ ? ?ሻ 
If the FP is obtained for exponentially distributed data and 
for time t, then the failure rate of the BE can be determined 
as: 
D? ൌെ ሺ ? െD?D?ሻD? ሺ ? ?ሻ 
D. RELIABILITY QUANTIFICATION 
The timed transitions of the GSPN model created in step 3 can 
now be completed with the failure data that have been 
estimated using fuzzy set theory and expert judgment. At this 
point, a mission time for the system can be defined and the 
completed GSPN model can be simulated to predict the 
reliability of the system for this mission time. 
1) CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
Criticality analysis allows identifying the critical BEs in the 
dynamic fault tree. The criticality of a BE is determined by 
calculating its contribution to the TE probability. This 
information can identify the weakest parts of the system, thus 
pointing towards areas for design improvement. Different 
criticality analysis techniques such as Birnbaum importance 
measures (BIM) and risk reduction worth [40] are widely 
used. 
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Using BIM, the contribution of a BE to the occurrence of 
the TE is determined by taking the difference between the 
TE probability, by setting the occurrence of the BE to 1 and 
0, respectively. In our proposed framework, we can use the 
GSPN model to obtain BIM of BEs as follows: 
 D?஻ா೔஻ூெ ൌ D?ሺ D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?B?D?D?௜ ൌ  ?ሻെ D?ሺ D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?B?D?D?௜ ൌ  ?ሻሺ ? ?ሻ 
Where D?஻ா೔஻ூெis the BIM of the basic eventD?D?௜ , D?ሺ D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?B?D?D?௜ ൌ  ?ሻ is the probability of the TE given 
that the probability of the D?D?௜ is 1 and D?ሺ D?D?D?D?D?D?D?D?B?D?D?௜ ൌ  ?ሻ is the probability of the TE given 
that the probability of the D?D?௜is 0. 
To make the probability of the D?D?௜ equal to 1, in the GSPN 
model, we have to set the firing rate of the corresponding 
timed transition to 1. On the other hand, to make a component 
fully available, i.e. consider the probability of a BE to be 0, we 
need to remove the token from the place representing the 
event. By doing this, we are ensuring that the transition 
connected to the place will never fire during the simulation. 
When the BIM of all components have been determined, we 
can rank them. The higher the BIM of an event, the more the 
critical the event is. 
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the application of the proposed method, we use a 
benchmark case study of a simplified Cardiac Assist System 
(CAS) in [8]. The system consists of four modules: trigger, 
CPU unit, motor section, and pumps. The DFT of the CAS is 
shown in Fig.15. BEs of the DFT with their reference tags are 
shown in Table IV. As seen in the DFT, the trigger connected 
to the FDEP gate can become true due to the failure of either 
the crossbar switch (CS) or the system supervision (SS) or 
both. This trigger will cause both CPU units (P and B) to fail. 
The CPUs themselves are in warm spare configuration, where 
P is the primary unit and the B is the backup unit with a 
dormancy factor of 0.5. For the motor section of the system to 
fail, both MOTOR and MOTORC have to fail. The pump unit 
contains two cold spare gates and for the pump unit to fail the 
CSPGate_1 has to fail before CSPGate_2. CSPGate_1 and 
CSPGate_2 have PUMP_1 and PUMP_2 as their primary unit, 
respectively, and both  CSP gates share a common spare 
(Backup_PUMP). 
 
   
FIGURE 15.  The CAS dynamic fault tree (modified after [8]).
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TABLE IV. THE CAS BASIC EVENTS (COMPONENTS) AND THEIR 
REFERENCE TAGS 
Reference Tag  Basic events (components) 
BE.1 CS 
BE.2 SS 
BE.3 P 
BE.4 B 
BE.5 MOTOR 
BE.6 MOTORC 
BE.7 PUMP_1 
BE.8 PUMP_2 
BE.9 Backup_PUMP 
 
We have considered that the failure rates of the BEs of the 
DFT are unknown. Following the process described in section 
III.B, the DFT in Fig. 15 is translated into a GSPN model and 
unknown failure rates of the BEs are collected according to the 
process described in section III.C. The GSPN model of the 
DFT after incorporating the failure rates of the BEs (values for 
timed transitions) is shown in Fig. 16. For the data collection 
process for BEs, a heterogeneous group of experts was 
employed. 
As it is evident from Table IWKHH[SHUWV¶ZHLJKWVDUHQRW
same (see Table V). Four experts participated in this study to 
make the judgments. Two of them have a M.Sc. degree in 
systems engineering and had been working as system analysts 
for over 8 years. The third expert has a B.Sc. degree in 
manufacturing engineering and he had been working as a 
consultant and trainer for over four years. The last expert has 
a Ph.D. in industrial engineering and she had been working as 
an academic staff for over ten years. Job tenure and current 
activities of these experts are summarized in Table VI.
 
    
FIGURE 16.  GSPN model of the DFT of Fig.15. 
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TABLE V. EXPERT WEIGHTING 
Expert Professional position Job Experience Education Age Weighting score 
Expert 1: Engineer (3) 6±9 (2) Master (4) (2) 11/49=0.22 
Expert 2: Engineer (3) 6±9 (2) Master (4) (3) 12/49=0.24 
Expert 3: Engineer (3)  Bachelor (3) (3) 10/49=0.21 
Expert 4: Senior academic (5) 10±19 (3) PhD (5) (3) 16/49=0.33 
Total     49/49=1.00 
 
TABLE VI. DETAILS OF THE EXPERTS 
Board name Occupation Age Educational Knowledge 
Job tenure in 
Industry 
Expert 1 (E1): System analyzer 36 Master of system engineering 
He has been working as system analyzer for 9 years. 
He is currently the head of system analyzer in design 
department of a company. 
Expert 2 (E2): System analyzer 42 Master of system engineering 
She has been working as system analyzer for 8 years. 
She is currently vice head of system analyzer in design 
department of a company. 
Expert 3 (E3): Consultant and trainer 43 Bachelor of manufacturing 
engineering 
He has been working as a consultant and trainer since 
2013. He is currently a member of safety department 
of automobile manufacturing. 
Expert 4 (E4): Academic staff 41 PhD industrial engineering She has been working as an academic staff in industrial department for more than 10 years. 
7KH H[SHUWV¶ GHFLVLRQ RQ WKH %(V ZKLFK KDYH XQNQRZQ
failure rates is given in Table VII. 
 
TABLE VII. EXPERTS¶ DECISION ON THE UNKNOWN BES (COMPONENTS) 
Reference Tag 
Experts  
E1 E2 E3 E4 
BE.1 VL L M VH 
BE.2 M VL H VL 
BE.3 H VL M H 
BE.4 H M H M 
BE.5 H M H VH 
BE.6 VH H M L 
BE.7 L VH H M 
BE.8 M VH M VL 
BE.9 M VH L H 
 
The SAM technique was used to aggregate expert opinions 
for t=1000 hours. BE.1 is taken as an example and the details 
of aggregation are provided in Table VIII. To compute 
consensus coefficient using Equation UHOD[DWLRQIDFWRUȕ
is considered to be 0.5 to give the weight of the experts and 
their relative agreement an equal importance. 
In addition, Equations (9) and (10) are applied to defuzzify 
the failure possibility of each BEs and also to transfer the 
corresponding fuzzy number to FP, respectively. The 
computation of BE.1 is done as an example and the results 
of other BEs are provided in Table IX. D?D?Ǥ  ?ൌ  ? ?൬ ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ൈ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ൈ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻ െ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻ൰ 
                              
                              = 0. 437391 D? ൌ ሺ ଵ଴Ǥସଷ଻ െ  ?ሻଵ ଷൗ ൈ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ൌ2.503 D?D?ൌ  ?  ? ?ଶǤହ଴ଷൗ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
From this FP value, using Equation (12) the failure rate is 
calculated as: D? ൌെ ሺ ? െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ ? ? ? ?  
 
                            =3.15E-06 
 
In the last step, we simulated the GSPN model of Fig. 16. 
Note that we use ORIS Petri net simulator [67] to create and 
simulate the GSPN model. The unreliability of the CAS 
system for different mission times is graphically presented in 
Fig.17. The criticality of the BEs of the DFT was calculated 
using the process described in section III.D.1 and BEs were 
ranked based on their criticality, as shown in Table X. As seen 
in the table, the basic events BE.1 and BE.2 are identified as 
the two most critical events.  These BEs represent the crossbar 
switch (CS) and system supervision (SS), respectively. Thus, 
if the analysts want to increase the reliability of the system 
then they may consider replacing these critical components 
using components with higher reliability or they may consider 
introducing redundant components in parallel with the critical 
components. 
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TABLE VIII. AGGREGATION CALCULATIONS FOR THE BE.1 
Expert 1 (0,0,0.1,0.2) 
Expert 2 (0.1,0.25,0.25,0.4) 
Expert 3 (0.3,0.5,0.5,0.7) 
Expert 4 (0.8,0.9,1,1) 
S(E1&E2) 0.825 D?൫D?ሚǡ D?෨൯ ൌ  ? െ ?D?෍ȁD?௜ െ D?௜ȁ௃௜ୀଵ  
S(E1&E3) 0.575 D?ாଵǡாଶ ൌ  ? െ ?  ?ൗ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ൅  ?Ǥ ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ?ሻ = 0.825 
S(E1&E4) 0.175  
S(E2&E3) 0.75  
S(E2&E4) 0.35  
S(E3&E4) 0.6  
AA(E1) 0.525 D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൌ  ?D? െ  ?෍ D?ሺD?෨ ǡ D?෨ ሻ௃௨ஷ௩௩ୀଵ  
AA(E2) 0.642  ? ሺ ? െ  ?ሻൗ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
AA(E3) 0.642  
AA(E4) 0.375  
RA(E1) 0.240 D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൌ D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ ? D?D?ሺD?௨ሻ௃௨ୀଵ  
RA(E2) 0.294  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻൗ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? 
RA(E3) 0.294  
RA(E4) 0.172  
CC(E1) 0.230 D?D?ሺD?ଵሻ ൌ D?  ? D?ሺD?௨ሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻ ڄ D?D?ሺଵሻ =  
CC(E2) 0.267 0.5 × 0.22 + 0.5 × 0.240 = 0.230 
CC(E3) 0.252  
CC(E4) 0.251  
Aggregation for BE.1 D?෨AGൌ D?D?ሺD?ଵሻ ٔ D?෨ଵ ْ D?D?ሺD?ଶሻ ٔ D?෨ଶ ْ ǥ ْ D?D?ሺD?௠ሻ ٔ D?෨ெ 
0.230ٔ(0,0,0.1,0.2) ْ 0.267ٔ (0.1,0.25,0.25,0.4)ْ 0.252ٔ (0.3,0.5,0.5,0.7)ْ 0.251ٔ (0.8,0.9,1,1) = 
(0.303,0.419,0.442,0.580) 
 
TABLE IX. DEFUZZIFICATION OF NUMBERS AND CORRESPONDING FP OF EACH BES 
Reference Tag Aggregated fuzzy set Defuzzification of BEs FP of BEs Failure rate 
BE.1 (0.303,0.419,0.442,0.580) 0.437552 0.003149 3.15E-06 
BE.2 (0.195,0.275,0.330,0.464) 0.318972 0.001089 1.09E-06 
BE.3 (0.405,0.537,0.557,0.710) 0.553785 0.007225 7.25E-06 
BE.4 (0.440,0.616,0.616,0.793) 0.616333 0.010847 1.09E-05 
BE.5 (0.588,0.735,0.735,0.883) 0.735333 0.023080 2.34E-05 
BE.6 (0.438,0.588,0.588,0.739) 0.588333 0.009062 9.10E-06 
BE.7 (0.449,0.602,0.602,0.756) 0.602333 0.009917 9.97E-06 
BE.8 (0.331,0.458,0.483,0.636) 0.478838 0.004296 4.31E-06 
BE.9 (0.468,0.619,0.619,0.769) 0.618667 0.011009 1.11E-05 
    
FIGURE 17. System unreliability for different mission times.
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2843166, IEEE Access
 Author Name: Preparation of Papers for IEEE Access (February 2017) 
VOLUME XX, 2017  
TABLE X. CRITICALITY OF THE BASIC EVENTS OF THE DFT IN FIG. 15 
BEs Name BIM RANK 
BE.1 0.625 1 
BE.2 0.563 2 
BE.3 0.251 5 
BE.4 0.181 6 
BE.5 0.261 4 
BE.6 0.492 3 
BE.7 0.040 7 
BE.8 0.034 8 
BE.9 0.022 9 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Reliability analysis of complex and dynamic systems such 
as cyber physical systems is intricate. There are multiple 
stochastic and temporal dependencies that need to be taken 
into account and not all the existing stochastic formalisms are 
able to grasp these dependencies. Besides, the failure 
specification of some components, i.e., failure rate, is difficult 
to obtain. Frequently, the engineers have a qualitative 
knowledge about the possible failure behaviour, but with 
existing state-of-the-art methods this is not enough to quantify 
they system reliability.  
In this context, this paper presents a novel uncertainty-
aware dynamic reliability analysis approach. The approach 
enables the specification of failure data from expert judgement 
for components with unknown failure rates. Statistical, 
stochastic and temporal dependencies among events are 
treated in the analysis through Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) and 
Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN). There are other 
approaches that have addressed some of these issues in an 
isolated manner. However, WR WKH EHVW RI WKH DXWKRUV¶
knowledge, not all issues have been covered in a single 
approach. Here this is achieved by combining DFT, GSPN, 
and fuzzy set theory.  
The use of DFTs helped to model time-dependant failure 
behaviour, dependency among events, redundancy in the 
system model, and priorities among events. Fuzzy set theory 
and expert judgment enable us to collect uncertain failure data 
and also to explicitly highlight the areas of uncertainty in the 
data. GSPN was used to take into account the statistical and 
stochastic dependencies among events, which helped to avoid 
inaccurate reliability estimation of the system by performing 
analysis under realistic assumptions. 
The effectiveness of the approach was demonstrated via 
application to a benchmark case study. The result obtained is 
believed to be improved and more useful than results derived 
with more traditional approaches due to the combined 
capabilities of the method.  
The use of expert judgement in estimating failure 
probabilities of BEs is not expected to be faultless, but can 
contribute to usefully quantifying what was previously 
unquantifiable. Note that the current method only obtained an 
exponentially distributed failure rate, however, to utilise the 
full potential of GSPN, it would be worthwhile to explore 
methods to obtain the failure rate function for other 
distributions. The criticality analysis allows analysts to 
identify weak areas of the system early and to focus redesign 
efforts correspondingly. The extent of scalability of this 
approach for the analysis of large-scale systems is not yet 
determined. It could be the case that GSPNs grow to sizes that 
make computations very demanding. However, if issues arise 
then modularisation techniques such as [68]-[71] may help to 
improve scalability of the analysis. 
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